2024-11-03 17:35:00
hardenedbsd.org
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) |
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Base compiled as Position-Independent Executables (PIEs) |
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Base compiled with RELRO + BIND_NOW |
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Ports tree compiled with PIE, RELRO, and BIND_NOW |
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Static PIE |
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ASLR brute force protection (SEGVGUARD) |
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Prevention of the creation of writable and executable memory mappings (W^X part one) |
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Restrictions on mprotect to prevent switching pages between writable and executable (W^X part two) |
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sysctl hardening |
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Network stack hardening (IP ID randomization, use IPv6 temporary addresses) |
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Executable file integrity enforcement |
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Boot hardening |
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procfs/linprocfs hardening |
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LibreSSL in base as the default cryptography library |
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SROP mitigation |
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Most of base sandboxed |
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Trusted Path Execution |
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SafeStack in base |
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SafeStack available in ports |
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Non-Cross-DSO Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) in base |
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Non-Cross-DSO Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) available in ports |
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Base compiled with retpoline |
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Ports tree compiled with retpoline |
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Intel SMAP+SMEP Support |
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Userland stack zero-initialized by default |
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Hardened RTLD by default |
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